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Crime and Punishment: The Eighth 
Amendment's Proportionality Guarantee Mter 
Harmelin v. Michigan 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote, 
"The first of all laws is to respect the laws: the severity of 
penalties is only a vain resource, invented by little minds in 
order to substitute terror for that respect which they have 
no means of obtaining."1 Unfortunately, the mentality to 
which Rousseau referred manifests itself with increasing 
frequency as state and federal legislators try in vain to 
reduce criminal activity. The quintessential example of this 
type of legislation is Michigan's drug possession law. The 
Michigan statute imposes a mandatory life sentence without 
possibility of parole for defendants convicted of possessing 
650 or more grams of any cocaine mixture, regardless of the 
purity of the mixture or the defendant's degree of culpability 
and criminal record. 2 The constitutionality of similar laws 
in other states has been vigorously and successfully chal-
lenged.3 However, during its 1990 term the Supreme Court 
reversed this trend by upholding the constitutionality of 
Michigan's "major controlled substance offense" statute.4 
Harmelin v. Michigan5 raises serious doubts about the 
future of the Eighth Amendment's proportionality guarantee. 
While there was no majority, a reading of the Court's and 
concurring Justices' opinions strongly suggests that this 
Court cannot be relied upon to safeguard the fundamental 
1. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A Dlf->COURSE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 119 (G.D.H. 
Cole trans., 175R). 
2. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7403(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 1990-1991). 
3. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (sustaining an Eighth Amendment 
challenge to a South Dakota recidivist statute on the grounds that a sentence of 
life imprisonment without possibility of parole was disproportionate); Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that it was cruel and unusual punishment 
to imprison a defendant for drug addiction). 
4. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S.Ct. 26RO (1991). 
5. ld. 
149 
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principle that criminal punishments must be proportional to 
the crime for which they are imposed.6 
This Note examines Harmelin's implications for propor-
tionality analysis within the Eighth Amendment and what 
action the Court should take if it should revisit this issue. 
Part II reviews the historical antecedents of the Eighth 
Amendment, the evolution of proportionality analysis in both 
capital and non-capital Eighth Amendment cases, and the 
status of proportionality analysis within the Eighth Amend-
ment prior to Harmelin. Part III provides the facts of 
Harmelin v. Michigan and the reasoning of the Court, con-
curring Justices, and dissent. Part IV analyzes Harmelin's 
implications and the proper role of proportionality analysis 
in Eighth Amendment adjudication. Finally, this Note con-
cludes that our society's conception of humanity and justice, 
and the Court's incongruent handling of proportionality in 
capital and non-capital Eighth Amendment cases, mandates 
recognition of the Eighth Amendment's proportionality guar-
antee in all cases. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE HISTORY OF PROPORTIONALITY 
AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT. 
This Note will use two different approaches to constitu-
tional interpretation. The first, a fixed historical approach, 7 
must be considered because the Supreme Court has clearly 
manifest its proclivity for this line of analysis. 8 However, 
6. Malcolm E. Wheeler, Toward a ThPory of Limited Punishment: An Examina-
tion of thP Ei~?hth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 85:3-54 (1972). 
7. When applied to the Eighth Amendment, this method "attempts to ascertain 
'the particular abuses that the Framers of the Constitution had in mind to correct 
[by looking to] those immemorial usages in England that were not rejected by the 
Colonies . . . .'" Deborah A. Schwartz & Jay Wishingrad, Comment, The Eighth 
Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the 
Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFF. L. REV. 78:3, 786 
(1971\). However, this method of constitutional interpretation should not be exclu-
sively relied upon. This very narrow intent-based analysis has led individual Justi-
ces, and at times the whole Court, to "suspect, if not invalid, and to inconsistent, 
if not incompatible, methods and explanations in applying the theory of the 'intent 
of the Framers' to the interpretation of the Constitution." 
!d. at 787. 
8. The Court's inclination to rely on the historical antecedents of the "cruel 
and unusual punishments" clause in interpreting the Eighth Amendment is plainly 
illustrated by Justice Scalia's opinion in Harmelin. First, Justice Scalia accurately 
observed, "SolPm based its conclusion principally upon the proposition that a right 
to be free from disproportionate punishments was embodied within the 'cruel and 
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there is some disagreement regarding the Court's preference 
for this more static, historical mode. Not only has the Court 
mandated a more flexible approach for itself, 9 but it has 
applied the principle often enough that at least one com-
mentator has observed, "[T]he Court has not attempted to 
interpret this provision of the Constitution in a purely his-
torical or static manner but has accepted the concept that it 
must develop over time."10 Thus, rather than endeavoring 
to resolve the conflicts over which method of constitutional 
interpretation is to be preferred or which has been most 
often applied by the Court, this Note analyzes the Eighth 
Amendment and its antecedents under both interpretative 
models. 
The starting point for both methods is consideration of 
the historical antecedents of the Eight Amendment's Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause. Although a detailed his-
tory of the concept of "cruel and unusual punishments" ex-
ceeds the scope of this paper/ 1 the evolution of this princi-
unusual punishments' provision of the English Declaration of Rights of 1689, and 
was incorporated, with that language, in the Eighth Amendment." Harmelin, 111 S. 
Ct. at 26R6. Secondly, Justice Scalia's extensive efforts to historically justify his 
opinion in Harmelin strongly imply that the Court is still inclined in this direction. 
See, id. at 2686-2699. Finally, it should be noted that generally, this is the Court's 
preferred approach to the Eighth Amendment. "In its search for purposeful stan-
dards to give meaning to the eighth amendment, the Supreme Court has usually 
employed the method of legal historical analysis as its key tool in the process of 
constitutional interpretation." Schwartz & Wishingrad, supra note 7, at 792. 
9. The Court has clearly recognized that flexibility in constitutional interpreta-
tion is essential. 
In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be 
only of what has been but of what may be. Under any other rule a con-
stitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient 
in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value and 
be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights 
declared in words might be lost in reality. And this has been recognized. 
The meaning and vitality of the Constitution have developed against nar-
row and restrictive construction. 
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). 
10. John B. Wefing, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 
47R, 4R4 (1990). 
11. Comprehensive histories of the English Declaration of Rights and the 
Eighth Amendment are readily available. Most notable in the context of propor-
tionality analysis are Charles Walter Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality 
Analysis and the Compelling Case of William Rummel, 71 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 378 (1980); LARRY CHARLES BERKSON, THE CONCEPI' OF CRUEL AND 
UNUSlJAL PUNISHMENT (1975); Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Inflicted:'' The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969). 
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ple during the past century can be traced and merits brief 
reVIew. 
The "cruel and unusual punishment" concept has been 
developing for centuries. It apparently originated with King 
Alfred in the tenth century (A.D. 900). 12 Approximately 
three hundred years later the principle was included in the 
Magna Carta (A.D. 1215) which "contained three provisions 
dealing with the concept of disproportionate punish-
ments."13 Three centuries later that principle was codified 
into English law in A.D. 1533. 14 However, it was not until 
the English Declaration of Rights (A.D. 1688) that the con-
cept took the form with which we now familiar. In fact, the 
English Declaration is the immediate progenitor of our 
Eighth Amendment. 15 Borrowing from the English Declara-
tion the principle was included in the Virginia Declaration 
of Rights (A.D. 1776), most other state constitutions, the 
Virginia Proposed Amendments to the Constitution (A.D. 
1788), and on June 8, 1789 James Madison offered a slight-
ly modified version of the Virginia proposal as an amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. 16 Finally, "on De-
cember 15, 1791 the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
became the Eighth Amendment and formally part of the law 
of the land."17 Because the Declaration of Rights is the 
most immediate predecessor to the Eighth Amendment, it 
should be the first step in any historical analysis of the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 
A. The English Declaration of Rights 
The relationship between the English Declaration of 
Rights and the Eighth Amendment is well established. In 
fact, the nexus between these two bodies of law is such, 
that it is rare to read about the "Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause" without first reading about its English 
12. Berkson, supra note 11, at 159. 
13. !d. at 3. 
14. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 2::!6 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1972). 
15. "The eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment was 
taken directly from the British Declaration of Rights of 16R8 .... " Wheeler, supra 
note 6, at 8:19. 
16. "Amendment proposed by Madison ... : 'Excessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.'" 
fi THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1008-09 (Edwin D. Webb ed., 1980). 
17. Berkson, supra note 11, at 8. 
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forerunner. However, while it is virtually undisputed that 
the Declaration of Rights was the model for early American 
state constitutions, 18 and ultimately the Bill of Rights, 19 
substantial controversy continues to surround the meaning 
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. This contro-
versy is best understood in terms of the two major areas of 
disagreement: 1) What was intended by the English 
Declaration's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punish-
ments"? 2) How did the American Framers understand the 
prohibition, and what was their intent in adopting the 
Eighth Amendment? 
The "cruel and unusual punishments" clause in the Dec-
laration of Rights essentially codified preexisting legal prin-
ciples.~w Therefore, it is significant to note that evidence 
indicates proportionality was among those principles the 
English framers sought to reinforce by adopting that docu-
ment. "The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments 
was based on the longstanding principle of English law that 
the punishment should fit the crime. That is, the punish-
ment should not be, by reason of its excessive length or 
severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged."21 
There is also substantial circumstantial evidence to support 
this conclusion. Notably, at the time of the Declaration of 
Rights, not only did "punishments involving torture and 
1H. "Following its inclusion in the Virginia constitution, eight other states 
adopted the clause, the federal government inserted it into the Northwest Ordi-
nance of 1787, and it became the eighth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion in 1791." Granucci, ;;upra note 11, at 840. 
19. ld. 
20. ld. at 847-60. 
21. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 14, at 236. "[P]rior to adoption of 
the Bill of Rights of 1689 England had developed a common law prohibition 
against excessive punishments in any form." Granucci, supra note 11, at R47. 
The English evidence shows that the cruel and unusual punishments 
clause of the Bill of Rights of 1689 was first, an objection to the imposi-
tion of punishments which were unauthorized by statute and outside the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and second, a reiteration of the Eng-
lish policy against disproportionate penalties. 
!d. at 860. 
The inhibition was incorporated into the English Bill of Rights in order to 
restrict the degree of punishment, and not to restrict the mode of inflict-
ing it. This is clearly established by an examination of early English 
documents and by analyzing the events immediately prior to and follow-
ing its adoption in 16R9. 
Berkson, ;;upra note 11, at 1fi9. 
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mutilation [continue] to be legal in cases where such pun-
ishments were deemed proportionate to the crime,"22 but 
infliction of the "[b]rutal penalties continued."23 
However, this conclusion regarding proportionality's 
place in the Declaration of Rights is not without its detrac-
tors. At least one commentator, Charles Walter Schwartz, 
has posited two reasons to believe that proportionality was 
not guaranteed by the English Declaration. First, he argued 
that "[d]isproportionate punishment continued to occur with 
great frequency following enactment of the English Bill of 
Rights."24 The only evidence adduced to support this asser-
tion is that the number of offenses labeled as capital crimes 
increased significantly between 1689 and 1800. However, 
this fact does little to support Schwartz' conclusion that 
disproportionate punishments were commonplace. The num-
ber of capital crimes in England in 1800, as compared to 
England in 1992, may be easily explained by acknowledging 
that Britain's conceptions of crime and proportionality have 
evolved as the framers of the Declaration intended. Further-
more, it must be remembered that disproportionality is a 
determination that must be based on contemporary mores 
and theories of punishment. Thus, the mere fact that some 
crimes that were labeled "capital" at the end of the eigh-
teenth century are not so labeled today, does not support 
the conclusion that the original label and attendant punish-
ment were disproportionate. Significantly, Schwartz provides 
no reason to believe that the labeling of crimes or the impo-
sition of punishments in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries was arbitrary and capricious, and considered dis-
proportionate by any group at that time. 
Schwartz' second argument is that there is no evidence 
that proportionality was mentioned in the parliamentary 
debate preceding adoption of the Declaration of Rights.25 
However, this unsupported assertion is clearly contrary to 
the historical evidence, which reflects the English framers' 
intent to prohibit disproportionate punishments. Therefore, 
because the English Declaration of Rights was clearly in-
tended to proscribe disproportionate punishments, reason 
22. SOURCES CW OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 14, at 286. 
23. Berkson, supra note 11, at 3. 
24. Schwartz, supra note 11, at :380. 
2fi. ld. at 381. 
I 
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dictates that rejection of proportionality analysis within the 
Eighth Amendment must be premised on the American 
Framers' renunciation of the principle, not on the historical 
fallacy that the English Declaration of Rights was not in-
tended to proscribe disproportionate punishments.26 
B. The American Framers and the Eighth Amendment 
While some have argued that there is insufficient histor-
ical evidence to determine the Framers' understanding of 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and their intent 
in adopting the Eighth Amendment, there is a substantial 
body of historical data to aid in the resolution of these 
questions. There are Congressional Records of the debates 
regarding the Bill of Rights, correspondence between dele-
gates during the ratification process, the state proposals for 
amending the Constitution and the individual states' consti-
tutions. While each of these alone may be inadequate to 
establish the Framers' intent, together, particularly when 
combined with records of the state ratification debates, there 
is "sufficient contemporary comment to establish the inter-
pretation which the Framers placed on the words 'cruel and 
unusual."'27 
While there is disagreement over the intended role of 
proportionality within the Eighth Amendment, the number 
of answers to the question is limited. Because there is a 
consensus that the Framers' intended to proscribe "cruel and 
unusual" modes of punishment,28 resolution of the ques-
26. In fact, in Harmelin, Justice Scalia makes a very similar argument. Al-
though his rationale is somewhat different, Justice Scalia contends, "Unless one 
accepts the notion of a blind incorporation, however, the ultimate question is not 
what 'cruel and unusual punishments' meant in the Declaration of Rights, but 
what its meaning was to the Americans who adopted the Eighth Amendment." 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2691 (1991). 
27. Granucci, supra note 11, at 841. 
2R. "Since the Amendment was passed with almost no debate at all, all we can 
say with certainty is that the Framers thought they were proscribing torture and 
other barbarous punishments." WILLIAM COHEN & JOHN KAPLAN, BILL OF RIGIITS, 
726 (1976). Unfortunately the case law in this area reflects the same lack of his-
torical precision. "Of the large number of cases decided which have interpreted the 
constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, several areas of 
significant agreement can be found. Among these is that the prohibition forbids 
every form of barbarism in meting out punishment that can be devised." 
THE VIRGINIA COMM'N ON CONSTITUTIONAL GoV'T, NOR CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUN-
ISHMENTS INFLICTED 16 (1965). 
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tions regarding proportionality within the Amendment can 
have only one of two results. Either the American Framers 
completely altered the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause from that intended by its English au-
thors by prohibiting undesirable methods rather than dis-
proportionate degrees of punishment, or the Americans ex-
panded the scope of the guarantee to protect against barba-
rous and excessive punishments. 
A consideration of the American Framers' intent would 
be inadequate without an examination of the different sour-
ces of their understanding of the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause. Contrary to popular belief, the Framers 
were influenced by more than their English experience. By 
the time the Framers began introducing and debating 
amendments to the Constitution, there was already a signifi-
cant body of colonial law identifying fundamental rights. 
Furthermore, by 1775 the European Enlightenment was well 
underway, and its influence had already extended to the 
Founders of this fledgling republic. 
1. The English Intent-An American Misunderstanding? 
In an effort to reconcile the Framers' clear intent to 
proscribe inhumane methods with the English Declaration of 
Rights' prohibition of excessive punishments, it has been 
suggested that the Framers' simply misunderstood their own 
legal history. 
However, a fresh look at the history of punishment in 
England, and especially the framing of the English Bill of 
Rights of 1689, indicates that the Framers themselves seri-
ously misinterpreted English law. Not only had Great 
Britain developed, prior to 1689, a general policy against 
excessiveness in punishments, but it did not prohibit "bar-
barous" punishments that were proportionate to an of-
fense.29 
However, this argument proceeds from an illogical premise. 
Mr. Granucci correctly argued that the Framers intended to 
prohibit inhumane forms of punishment. However, as a 
concomitant to this he asserted that the Framers must have 
misunderstood the intent of the English Declaration because 
29. Granucci, supra note 11, at 84a-44. 
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"their interpretation of the cruel and unusual punishments 
clause [was] opposite to that of the English view."30 How-
ever, this conclusion assumes that the prohibition of inhu-
mane modes of punishment is mutually exclusive with the 
proscription of excessive punishments. Clearly this is not the 
case, and Granucci does not attempt to explain why it 
might be. 
A more plausible explanation of this American modifica-
tion is that the American Framers recognized the flaw in 
the English interpretation of the "cruel and unusual punish-
ments" clause and sought to remedy it. It is well estab-
lished that the Americans valued the proportionality princi-
ple so greatly that they explicitly provided for it in many of 
their state constitutions. "The authors of the state constitu-
tions knew precisely how to prohibit disproportionate pun-
ishments and clearly did so."31 However, Schwartz argued 
that because many of the state constitutions expressly recog-
nized the proportionality principle, the Framers must not 
have intended to include it in the Federal Bill of Rights 
because they did not explicitly mention it. 32 This argument 
is counterintuitive. Proceeding from the premise that the 
principle was important enough to include in state constitu-
tions, surely the Framers considered it important enough to 
include in the Federal Constitution. Mter all, it was the 
federal government that many of the Framers feared most. 
This is consistent with the second alternative above, that 
the Framers intended to expand the scope of the Clause, 
not to redefine it. 33 The Framers' failure to explicitly pro-
30. !d. at 860. 
31. Schwartz, supra note 11, at 381. 
32. !d. at 382. 
33. There are a number of possible explanations for why the Americans would 
broaden the scope of the Eighth Amendment. The most likely is that they were 
particularly concerned about inhumane punishments, and this concern highlighted 
the weaknesses of the Declaration of Rights. There is considerable historical evi-
dence of the early colonists' concerns with barbarous punishments. 
"When the concept reached American shores, however, it took on a different 
meaning. From the very beginning, Americans expressed a great concern over cruel 
and unusual modes of punishment, as is illustrated in the Massachusetts Body of 
Liberties (1641). Many were rarely, if ever, utilized in the colonies." Berkson, supra 
note 11, at 159. Berkson further explains that in spite of the English Declaration's 
focus on proportionality, "Upon introduction to North America, the concept took on 
expanded meaning and emphasis was placed upon restricting the kind of punish-
ment that might be imposed." !d. at 65 (emphasis added). However, Berkson con-
cludes that although the excessiveness doctrine was neglected, it was not excised 
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vide for proportionality by proscribing excessive punishments 
is most logically understood to reflect the Framers' view 
that the proportionality principle is inherent in the Eighth 
Amendment, and therefore there was no need to explicitly 
provide for it. 
2. The Enlightenment and the Colonial Conception of the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
In the abstract, the fixed historical approach to constitu-
tional interpretation is methodologically sound. However, the 
validity of any such conclusion necessarily depends on the 
adequacy of the historical research. One of the fundamental 
problems with the evolution of Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence has been the Court's failure to base its opinions on 
horizontally and vertically cumulative historical data.34 It is 
not enough for the Court to consider a single historical 
strand of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Rath-
er, if the Court is to indulge its preference for legal histori-
cal analysis, it must consider all historical aspects of the 
prohibition's evolution. 
What the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments 
was intended to forbid remains questionable. Acceptance of 
the clause as the outcome of only 17th Century thought 
and history is to ignore nearly 100 years of American 
historical development. It is also a denial of 100 years of 
critical thinking by the philosophers who were widely read 
and influential in the new, as well as the old, world prior 
to the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution. 
from the Eighth Amendment. 
As the decades and centuries wore on, the notion that the phrase restrict-
ed the degree of punishment was deemphasized, while at the same time 
emphasis was placed on the idea that the phrase restricted the mode of 
punishment. This led many scholars and jurists to believe that the cruel 
and unusual punishment inhibition restricted only certain methods of 
punishment, as is evidenced in the nineteenth century decisions of both 
state and federal courts. Nevertheless, the idea that the prohibition re-
stricted the degree as well was by no means dead. 
!d. at 159 (emphasis added). 
34. In this vein, it has been noted that, "Errors are the inevitable result of the 
use of incomplete historical sources. More specifically, the Court has relied on Eng-
lish history while slighting the importance of the Enlightenment which swept Eu-
rope and influenced the political ideology of the Framers." Schwartz & Wishingrad, 
supra note 7, at 792. 
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Such an omission is clearly illogical, yet that is, in effect, 
the position of the Supreme Court.35 
159 
In short, if an historical approach to interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments" 
is taken, that analysis must include consideration of the 
Enlightenment and its impact on the American Framers.36 
A complete discussion of the Enlightenment's role in the 
development of American Eighth Amendment understanding 
necessarily involves consideration of some of the European 
philosophers. The most noteworthy among these are Vol-
taire, Montesquieu, and "especially Beccaria."37 While Vol-
taire, Montesquieu and others questioned the premises of 
their respective criminal codes, as a group they "found their 
spokesman in Cesare Beccaria, whose treatise On Crimes 
and Punishments was written in Italy in 1764."38 
There can be no debate regarding the influence of the 
Enlightenment thinkers on the Founding Fathers.39 Not 
only do we know that the Framers were familiar with the 
writings of "social critics such as Voltaire, Rousseau, 
Montesquieu, and Beccaria,"40 but there is irrefutable evi-
dence that "these ideas were studied earnestly by the revo-
lutionary leaders, during and after the war, in an effort to 
35. !d. at 815-16. 
36. "Incorporating these Enlightenment doctrines into the historical method of 
reasoning would insure that the eighth amendment becomes the viable protection it 
was meant to be, rather than an historical curiosity with limited contemporary 
impact." !d. at 793. 
37. !d. at 784-85. 
38. !d. at 808. 
39. It is essential not to underestimate the influence Beccaria and others had 
on American thought. 
The force of Beccaria's treatise On Crimes and Punishments was felt as 
much in America as in Europe. There were three American translations of 
Beccaria, each coupled with Voltaire's Commentary, which were published 
in America before the formulation of the Bill of Rights. They became 
immediately popular at both bookstores and lending libraries. In every 
colony, the ideas and writing of such social critics and reformers as Vol-
taire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, and Beccaria were known and often quoted. 
As Justice Douglas recognized nearly two centuries later: "The Italian 
jurist Beccaria and his French and English followers influenced American 
thought in the critical years following our Revolution." 
ld. at 813 (quoting Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 450 (1956) (Douglas, J. 
dissenting)). 
40. I d. at 807. 
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reform their own institutions."41 Examples of this influence 
can be found in state constitutions,42 correspondence be-
tween the Framers,43 and in some of the political writings 
of the period.44 Thus, there can be little question regarding 
the role of the Enlightenment in early American thought 
regarding the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 
Not surprisingly however, it has been argued that there 
is no evidence of a causal relationship between Beccaria's 
writings and the Eighth Amendment.45 However, there is a 
41. ld. at 807-08. 
42. A clear example of the Enlightenment philosophers influence is found by 
examining the history of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 
Admittedly influenced by the French philosophers like Voltaire, Rousseau, 
and Montesquieu, the delegates [to the Pennsylvania Constitutional Con-
vention] prepared both "A Declaration of Rights" taken almost verbatim 
from the "Virginia Bill of Rights" and a constitution which has been 
called the "closest approach to political perfection ever devised by man-
kind." The provision in the body of the constitution ... reads as follows: 
"The penal laws, as heretofore used, shall be reformed by the future Leg-
islature of this State, as soon as may be, and punishments made in some 
cases less sanguinary and in general more proportionate to the crimes." It 
is interesting to note that the emphasis seems to be more upon the pro-
portionality between crime and punishment than on the sanguinary as-
pects. In other words, a limited use of torture or so-called inhuman or 
barbarous types of punishment for heinous offenses might be less objec-
tionable than the imposition of excessive terms of imprisonment, a theo-
retically "humane" punishment. 
ld. at 821. 
43. In personal correspondence both Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin 
referred to the need for proportional punishments. While he was revising Virginia's 
laws in the summer of 1776 Jefferson wrote Edmund Pendleton: 
Punishments I know are necessary, and I would provide them, strict and 
inflexible, but proportioned to the crime. Death might be inflicted for 
murther and perhaps for treason if you would take out the description of 
treason all crimes which are not such in their nature. Rape, buggery & c. 
punish by castration, all other crimes by working on high roads, rivers, 
gallies & c. a certain time proportioned to the offense .... Laws thus 
proportionate and mild should never be dispensed with. 
ld. at 817-18. Another example of the Framers' commitment to proportionality is 
found in a letter from Benjamin Franklin to Benjamin Vaughan, dated 1785. 
"Franklin objected to the lack of proportionality in English Law which provided 
death for offenses ranging from theft to murder. He said, '[t]o put a man to Death 
for an Offense which does not deserve Death, is it not Murder?'" ld. at 822. 
44. The totality of the Enlightenment's influence on American thought is clearly 
illustrated by an excerpt from the writings of William Bradford, President George 
Washington's Attorney General. He "referred in his writings on criminal law to the 
ideas of Montesquieu and Beccaria as having set forth the general principles upon 
which penal laws ought to be founded." Id. at 823. 
45. As an illustration of the objection, Schwartz argues that simply proving 
Thomas Jefferson read Beccaria does not establish that he integrated those ideas 
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sound body of historical data that establishes the Framers' 
familiarity with Enlightenment principles, and references 
those principles as the source of at least some of the 
Framers' constitutional philosophies. The proportionality 
principle in the Eighth Amendment was one of these. 
Beccaria's treatise On Crimes and Punishments, together 
with Voltaire's and Montesquieu's works on criminal law 
reform, provided the philosophical basis for the principle of 
proportionality of punishment. Since these works influenced 
American colonial leaders, the principle of proportionality 
must necessarily be reflected in the Eighth Amendment.46 
C. The Evolution of Proportionality in American Case Law 
Although the Supreme Court has been addressing "cruel 
and unusual punishment" questions for well over a centu~ 
ry,47 Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is still evolving. No~ 
where is this more apparent than in the Court's proportion~ 
ality decisions. Unfortunately, the Court has unnaturally 
altered this evolution by artificially distinguishing between 
capital and non~capital cases. The artificiality of this "dis~ 
tinction" is particularly significant because it lies at the 
heart of the Court's and concurring Justices' opinions in 
Harmelin. Therefore, it is important to examine the evolu~ 
tion of proportionality in capital and non-capital cases, and 
understand how this distinction has affected the develop-
ment of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 
1. Proportionality in Non-capital Cases 
Although the Court has been called upon to construe 
the Eighth Amendment many times, proportionality has only 
been at issue in a handful of cases. A review of the Court's 
non-capital proportionality decisions should begin with 
Weems v. United States,48 the first and arguably most im-
portant opinion in this line of cases. 
into his constitutional philosophy. "Jefferson was a widely read man; certainly no 
one has seriously argued that all that he read was adopted by reference in the 
Constitution." Schwartz, supra note 11, at 381. 
46. ld. at 785. 
47. The Court first addressed the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and 
unusual punishments" in 1867. The case was Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. (5 
Wall.) 608 (1867). Schwartz, supra note 11, at 382. 
48. 217 U.S. :~49 (1910). 
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Weems, a disbursing officer of the Bureau of Coast 
Guard and Transportation of the United States Government 
of the Philippine Islands, was convicted of falsifying a "pub-
lic and official document" in order to misappropriate approx-
imately 616 pesos (Philippine currency). Following his con-
viction Weems was sentenced to 15 years cadena tempo-
ral.49 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court clearly 
recognized the principle of proportionality for non-capital 
cases and declared Weems' sentence to be "cruel and unusu-
al."50 The precedent value of this case cannot be overstat-
ed. Weems was the first time a majority of the Supreme 
Court recognized the Eighth Amendment guarantee that 
49. ld. at 358. Weems' punishment was described as follows: 
The punishment of cadena temporal is from twelve years and one day 
to twenty years (arts. 28 and 96), which "shall be served" in certain "pe-
nal institutions." And it is provided that "those sentenced to cadena tem-
poral and cadena perpetua shall labor for the benefit of the state. They 
shall always carry a chain at the ankle, hanging from the wrist; they 
shall be employed at hard and painful labor, and shall receive no assis-
tance whatsoever from without the institution." Arts. 105, 106. There are 
besides certain accessory penalties imposed, which are defined to be (1) 
civil interdiction; (2) perpetual absolute disqualification; (3) subjection to 
surveillance during life. These penalties are defined as follows: 
Art. 42. Civil interdiction shall deprive the person punished as 
long as he suffers it, of the rights of parental authority, guardian-
ship of person or property, participation in the family council, 
marital authority, the administration of property, and the right to 
dispose of his own property by acts inter vivos. Those cases are 
excepted in which the law explicitly limits its effects. 
Art. 43. Subjection to the surveillance of the authorities impos-
es the following obligations on the person punished. 
1. That of fixing his domicile and giving notice thereof to the 
authority immediately in charge of his surveillance, not being 
allowed to change it without the knowledge and permission of said 
authority in writing. 
2. To observe the rules of inspection prescribed. 
3. To adopt some trade, art, industry, or profession, should he 
not have known means of subsistence of his own. 
"Whenever a person punished is placed under the surveillance 
of the authorities, notice thereof shall be given to the government 
and to the governor general." 
The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification is the depri-
vation of office, even though it be held by popular election, the 
deprivation of the right to vote or to be elected to public office, 
the disqualification to acquire honors, etc., and the loss of retire-
ment pay, etc. 
ld. at 364-65. 
50. ld. at 366-67, 377. 
r 
l 
I 
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punishments must be proportioned to crimes.51 Further-
more, although the Harmelin Court attempted to limit the 
holding in Weems, the case has never been overruled. Thus, 
the Weems Court's analysis continues to be the cornerstone 
of contemporary Eighth Amendment proportionality law. 
Following its 1910 decision in Weems, the Court did not 
revisit the issue of Eighth Amendment proportionality in a 
significant way until 1958.52 At that time the Court decid-
ed Trop v. Dulles.53 In Trop, a native-born American was 
convicted of wartime desertion, and subsequently stripped of 
his United States citizenship. On appeal Trop argued that 
the sentence contravened the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
of "cruel and unusual punishments." In its opinion the 
Court observed that even after Weems, "[t]he exact scope of 
the constitutional phrase 'cruel and unusual' has not been 
detailed by this Court."54 However, in spite of that the 
Court relied on the general policy rationale set forth in 
Weems, 55 and held the sentence to be "cruel and unusual." 
Although the Court did not find the sentence to be dispro-
portionate, the Court implicitly recognized the validity of the 
proportionality principle.56 Hence, Trop further solidified 
the role of proportionality analysis within Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence. 
The next significant development in non-capital Eighth 
Amendment proportionality cases occurred in Robinson v. 
California. 57 In that case the petitioner challenged the va-
lidity of a Califomia statute that made it illegal to ''be 
addicted to the use of narcotics." The petitioner contended 
that the statute violated the Eighth Amendment ban of 
"cruel and unusual punishments." The Court's opinion was 
noteworthy for two reasons. First, as in Trop, the Court 
implicitly recognized the role of proportionality in Eighth 
Amendment adjudication. 58 The second, and more revolu-
51. ld. at 382. 
52. Schwartz, supra note 11, at 387. 
fi3. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
54. ld. at 99 (footnote omitted). 
55. ld. at 100-02. 
56. "[B ]y negative implication the Trop Court recognized the dis proportionality 
principle: 'Since wartime desertion is punishable by death, there can be no argu-
ment that the penalty of denationalization is excessive in relation to the gravity of 
the crime.'" Schwartz, supra note 11, at 387. 
57. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
58. !d. at 666-67. 
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tionary change wrought by Robinson was the Court's exten-
sion of the Eighth Amendment to the states, via the Four-
teenth Amendment.59 Since Robinson, the Eighth Amend-
ment has been read to proscribe "cruel and unusual punish-
ments" at both the state and federal levels. 
The fourth case to significantly affect the evolution of 
the proportionality principle in non-capital cases was 
Rummel v. Estelle. 60 In that case Rummel was sentenced 
to life imprisonment after his third felony conviction. He 
challenged the sentence on the ground that it "was so dis-
proportionate to the crimes he had committed as to consti-
tute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."61 However, in con-
trast to its decisions in Weems, Trop, and Robinson, the 
Court refused to consider the disproportionality of the sen-
tence. Rather, the Court attempted to justify its decision by 
arguing that capital and non-capital cases are inherently 
different, and that the length of the prison sentence im-
posed for a felony is "purely a matter of legislative preroga-
tive."62 Thus, in one fell swoop, and with absolute dis-
regard for the principle of stare decisis, the Court removed 
proportionality from Eighth Amendment analysis in all non-
capital cases. 
The final non-capital predecessor to Harmelin that mer-
its attention is Solem. 63 Ironically, although the facts of 
this case are nearly identical to those in Rummel, it is 
difficult to imagine a more antithetical opinion. Solem was 
sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parol 
under South Dakota's recidivist statute. He appealed con-
tending the sentence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The Court agreed, citing the disproportionality 
of the punishment as the reason for its decision. Solem, 
more than any case since Weems, explicitly recognized pro-
portionality as an element of the Eighth Amendment.64 In 
fact, for the first time since Weems recognized the principle 
59. ld. at 666-67, 675. 
60. 445 U.S. 263 (19RO). 
61. Id. at 265. 
62. ld. at 274. 
63. Solem v. Helm, 468 U.S. 277 (1983). 
64. The Court wrote, "We hold as a matter of principle that a criminal sen-
tence must be proportionate to the crime for which the Defendant has been con-
victed." ld. at 290. 
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of proportionality, the Court provided clear criteria for deter-
mining the Eighth Amendment's scope. 65 Thus, after Solem 
and until the Court issued its decision in Harmelin, there 
was little doubt that proportionality was an integral part of 
the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for 
non-capital cases. 
2. Proportionality in Capital Cases 
Proportionality review of capital punishment has proven 
to be far less controversial than application of the propor-
tionality principle in non-capital cases.66 In fact, after a 
plurality of the Court recognized the proportionality princi-
ple for these cases in 1976,67 there has been little if any 
question regarding the propriety of such analysis. Ironically, 
perhaps the best evidence of the acceptance of proportion-
ality in capital punishment review is found in Rummel, a 
non-capital case. In that case Justice Rehnquist, writing for 
the Court, argued that because of the inherent differences 
between capital punishment and all other criminal sanctions, 
the use of proportionality analysis in capital cases could not 
justify its application to non-capital questions. 68 However, 
ignoring for the moment the validity of this distinction, 
Justice Rehnquist's argument clearly reflects the Court's 
strong support for applying the proportionality principle to 
capital cases. Thus, the historical paradox is clear. If the 
distinction between capital and non-capital cases is invalid, 
the Court cannot consider the proportionality of the punish-
ment in capital cases and disregard the proportionality prin-
ciple when confronted by Eighth Amendment challenges to 
non-capital sentences. 
65. "[A] Court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be 
guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harsh-
ness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same 
jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in 
other jurisdictions." ld. at 292. 
66. "[A]fter 1971 the proportionality principle was frequently developed within 
[death penalty] cases." Schwartz, supra note 11, at 388. 
67. ld. at 389. 
68. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 270-75 (1980). 
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Ill. HARMELIN V. MICHIGAN 
A. The Facts 
On May 12, 1986, Ronald Allen Harmelin was arrested 
for possessing 672 grams of cocaine. He was subsequently 
convicted, and sentenced under Michigan state law to a 
mandatory life term without the possibility of parole. Mter 
initially reversing Harmelin's conviction because of an illegal 
search,69 the Michigan Court of Appeals vacated its original 
decision and affirmed the sentence. 70 In 1990 the Michigan 
Supreme Court refused to hear Harmelin's appeal,71 but 
later that year the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari. 72 
B. The Supreme Court's Rationale 
As previously indicated, there was no ml'\iority opmwn 
in Harmelin. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, was 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Kennedy wrote 
the concurrence, and was joined by Justices O'Connor and 
Souter. Finally, Justice White drafted the dissent, and was 
joined in all relevant respects by Justices Blackmun, 
Marshall and Stevens. Since there was no ml'\iority, there is 
no single explanation of the opinion. This section will pro-
vide the reasoning of all three factions on the Court. 
1. The Court's Opinion 
The essence of the Court's opmwn IS that "the Eighth 
Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee.'m To 
support this conclusion Justice Scalia made a number of 
arguments. Justice Scalia's first target was Solem. In his 
attack he returned to Justice Rehnquist's analysis in 
Rummel. He then reasserted Rummel's fundamental premise, 
that the length of a sentence imposed for felonies is "purely 
a matter of legislative intent."74 Justice Scalia also con-
tended that Solem's three-prong test is necessarily invalid 
69. 440 N.W.2d 75 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). 
70. !d. at 80. 
71. 434 Mich. 863 (1990). 
72. Harmelin v. Michigan, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990). 
73. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2686 (1991). 
74. ld. at 2686. 
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because it had been rejected by the Rummel Court.75 How-
ever, he offered no rationale, and cited no authority other 
than Rummel, to support either of these contentions. Never-
theless, Justice Scalia relied on these two arguments to con-
clude that Solem should be overruled. 76 
The Court's second argument was also directed, in large 
part, at Solem. Justice Scalia asserted that Solem relied 
heavily upon the finding that the English Declaration of 
Rights contained a proportionality guarantee.77 He then 
argued that the Declaration was intended to proscribe "ille-
gal" methods of punishment, rather than 
disproportionality. 78 
Ironically, Justice Scalia's third argument is that it does 
not matter what the intent of the English Declaration of 
Rights was because it would have been impossible to trans-
plant that understanding into the American legal system. 79 
He argued instead, that we should only consider what the 
American Framers intended.80 He then proffered three rea-
sons why the American Framers could not have intended 
the Eighth Amendment to proscribe disproportionate punish-
ments. He contended that had the Framers wanted to ban 
disproportionate punishment, they would have done so in 
clear and unambiguous language.81 He further argued that 
because proportionality analysis relies on consideration of 
defined offenses, the Framers could not have intended to 
proscribe disproportionality because the government "had 
never before defined offenses."82 Finally, Justice Scalia as-
serted that the available historical evidence supports his 
conclusion that the Framers did not intend to include pro-
portionality in the Eighth Amendment.83 
The Court's next argument is that no criteria exists to 
identify disproportionate punishments. "For the real-world 
enterprise, the standards seem so inadequate that the pro-
portionality principle becomes an invitation to imposition of 
75. ld. at 2684. 
76. ld. at 2686. 
77. /d. 
78. ld. at 2690-91. 
79. ld. at 2691. 
80. /d. 
81. ld. at 2692. 
82. ld. at 2693. 
83. /d. 
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subjective values."84 Justice Scalia then proceeded to indict 
the Solem test by asserting that the first two prongs are 
subjective and that the third "has no conceivable relevance 
to the Eighth Amendment."85 
Finally, he conceded that the Court has recognized the 
proportionality principle in the past. However, he dismissed 
those cases with three arguments. First, he attempted to 
moot out Weems by arguing that the language of that case 
can be read to support or reject proportionality.86 Second, 
he argued that because the Supreme Court did not explicitly 
apply Weems for nearly sixty years it cannot be binding on 
the Court today. 87 Finally, he dismissed the line of capital 
cases recognizing proportionality by distinguishing them 
from non-capital cases involving sentences for a term of 
years.88 
In short, Justice Scalia argued that there is no histori-
cal, textual, or precedential justification for reading propor-
tionality into the Eighth Amendment. While these argu-
ments are superficially compelling, this Note will show that 
they rely on internally inconsistent analysis, and are little 
more than the easiest way to reach the Court's desired end. 
2. The Concurring Opinion 
As could be expected, given the extreme nature of the 
Court's ,()pinion, the concurrence differed fundamentally with 
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist. The concurring 
Justices, unlike Justice Scalia and the Chief Justice, felt 
bound by stare decisis to recognize a "narrow proportionality 
principle that has existed in our Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence for 80 years."89 Moreover, they acknowledged that 
the proportionality principle extends to non-capital cases.90 
In his opinion, Justice Kennedy devoted most of his atten-
tion to discussing five principles that he argued "give con-
tent to the uses and limits of proportionality review."91 
R4. ld. at 2697. 
85. ld. at 2697-98. 
86. ld. at 2700. 
87. ld. 
R8. ld. at 2701. 
89. Id. at 2702 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
90. Id. at 27oa. 
91. ld. at 2703-05. 
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The first of these principles is that "the fixing of prison 
terms for specific crimes involves a substantive penological 
judgment" that should be left to the legislatures.92 Justice 
Kennedy then argued from this premise that courts should 
give "substantial deference" to this legislative determination 
when reviewing sentences under Eighth Amendment propor-
tionality challenges.93 In essence, the concurrence argued 
that legislatively imposed sentences are presumptively con-
stitutional, and that this presumption can only be overcome 
by a showing of gross disproportionality. 
The second principle identified by Justice Kennedy is 
that under the Eighth Amendment, legislatures are free to 
adopt any theory of punishment they see fit. 94 This argu-
ment, like the first, was intended to support the notion that 
a legislatively prescribed sentence carries a presumption 
that is not easily overcome. Hence, a court cannot find that 
a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment merely because 
it disagrees with the penological theory underlying the stat-
ute. 
Justice Kennedy's third principle is also intended to 
strengthen the presumption that legislatively mandated 
sentences enjoy. In essence, he argued that because legisla-
tures are free to disagree with one another about theories of 
punishment, they inevitably impose sentences that vary in 
degree.95 Thus, before a court can reject a legislatively 
mandated sentence because it is more excessive than those 
imposed in other states, it must be established that the 
different legislatures were operating under the same 
penological philosophy. 
The fourth principle is that "proportionality review by 
federal courts should be informed by 'objective factors to the 
maximum possible extent."'96 Unfortunately, Justice Kenne-
dy did not propose any such standards. Instead, he merely 
pointed out that there is a clear distinction between capital 
and non-capital cases, and that the lack of any such criteria 
for non-capital cases explains why so few non-capital sen-
92. ld. at 2703. 
93. ld. at 2703-04. 
94. ld. at 2704. 
95. !d. 
96. !d. 
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tences have been found to be disproportionate.97 However, 
this need for objective criteria does not justify rejection of 
the Solem test, as the Court advocated. On the contrary, if 
Solem's are the most objective criteria available, then 
Justice Kennedy's need for "objective factors" operates as a 
warrant for Solem's three-prong test. 
Finally, Justice Kennedy cited Solem and Weems for the 
proposition that "the Eighth Amendment does not require 
strict proportionality between crime and sentence."98 He 
argued that it proscribes only "grossly disproportionate" 
sentences.99 Unfortunately, as with principle four, Kennedy 
provided no criteria for determining when a punishment is 
"grossly disproportionate." He simply asserted that this 
should be the first inquiry by reviewing courts, and unless 
"a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the 
sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross 
disproportionality" the court need not inquire further. 100 
However, in the absence of any criteria for determining 
what is "grossly disproportionate," this position is internally 
inconsistent with Justice Kennedy's fourth principle, that 
"objective factors" must be used in proportionality review. 
These two principles contradict one another because absent 
an objective criteria for determining "gross 
disproportionality," Justice Kennedy is forcing courts to 
subjectively determine whether a punishment is "grossly 
disproportionate," and therefore unconstitutional. Further-
more, requiring a showing of "gross disproportionality" fun-
damentally alters the proportionality principle by raising the 
threshold at which a punishment becomes unconstitutional, 
and thereby limiting the scope of the Eighth Amendment's 
prohibition of all "cruel and unusual punishments." 
3. The Dissenting Opinion 
The first part of the dissenting opmwn refutes Justice 
Scalia's rationale. Justice White's first point was that pro-
portionality is implicit in the spirit and structure of the 
Eighth Amendment. To support this conclusion Justice 
White cited Benjamin Oliver, who was also cited by Justice 
97. !d. at 2705. 
98. ld. 
99. ld. 
100. !d. at 2707. 
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Scalia. 101 Oliver first reasoned that the prohibition of ex-
cessive bail and fines was intended to indirectly limit courts' 
authority to imprison offenders by imposing bail and fines 
that the defendant's were incapable of paying. 10:.l Second, 
Oliver argued that the spirit of the Eighth Amendment 
requires a proportionality limit on courts' and legislatures' 
discretion to imprison. 
In the absence of all express regulations on the subject, it 
would surely be absurd to imprison an individual for a 
term of years, for some inconsiderable offence, and conse-
quently it would seem, that a law imposing so severe a 
punishment must be contrary to the intention of the fra-
mers of the constitution. 103 
Justice White's second argument was that there were 
sufficient legal standards in 1787 to make consideration of 
proportionality possible. "[T]he people of the new Nation had 
been living under the criminal law regimes of the States, 
and there would have been no lack of benchmarks for deter-
mining unusualness."104 Justice White's final response to 
Justice Scalia was that there is insufficient historical evi-
dence to justify the Court's conclusion that the Framers did 
not intend the Eighth Amendment to encompass proportion-
ality.105 
Mter specifically refuting Justice Scalia, Justice White 
made three other significant arguments. First, he pointed 
out that the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the 
proportionality principle on several occasions. 106 He 
strengthened this argument by pointing out, "[n]ot only is it 
undeniable that our cases have construed the Eighth 
Amendment to embody a proportionality component, but it 
is also evident that none of the Court's cases suggest that 
101. ld. at 2709 (White, J., dissenting). 
102. Id. 
10:1. Id. at 2710. 
104. ld. at 2710. 
lOfi. "Even if one were to accept the argument that the First Congress did not 
have in mind the proportionality issue, the evidence would hardly be strong 
enough to come close to proving an affirmative decision against the proportionality 
component." ld. 
106. "Among others, Justice White specifically cites the Court's opinions in Gregg 
v. Georgia, 42R U.S. 153 (1976), Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 5H4 (1977), and 
Enmund v. Florida, 45R U.S. 7R2 (1982)." ld. at 2711-12. 
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such a construction is impermissible."107 Thus, in spite of 
the Court's assertion to the contrary, one can confidently 
conclude that Supreme Court precedent supports the Eighth 
Amendment's proportionality guarantee. 
Justice White's third argument is that Justice Scalia's 
acceptance of proportionality in capital cases is logically 
inconsistent with his rejection of the proportionality princi-
ple in non-capital cases. 108 Justice White argued that the 
Court "ignore[d] the generality of the Court's several pro-
nouncements about the Eighth Amendment's proportionality 
component. And it fail[ed] to explain why the words 'cruel 
and unusual' include a proportionality requirement in some 
cases but not in others."109 Justice White concluded, 
The Court's capital punishment cases requiring proportion-
ality reject Justice Scalia's notion that the Amendment 
bars only cruel and unusual modes or methods of punish-
ment. Under that view, capital punishment-a mode of 
punishment-would either be completely barred or left to 
the discretion of the legislature. Yet neither is true. The 
death penalty is appropriate in some cases and not in 
others. The same should be true of punishment by impris-
onment.110 
Justice White's fourth and final major contention is that 
the Eighth Amendment has never been and should never be 
bound by purely historical considerations. 111 Rather, Jus-
tice White argued the Court has long recognized the evolv-
ing nature of the Eighth Amendment. 112 He suggested that 
the test for this evolution is the "evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."113 
Implicit in this test is that the standard must be a contem-
porary, rather than a historical, conception of humanity. "In 
evaluating a punishment under this test, 'we have looked 
107. !d. at 2711. 
108. !d. at 2712. 
109. !d. 
110. !d. 
111. !d. 
112. Citing the Court's opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. :i61, 369 (198-
9) Justice White observed that the Court "has 'not confined the prohibition embod-
ied in the Eighth Amendment to "barbarous" methods that were generally outlawed 
in the 18th century,' but instead has interpreted the Amendment 'in a flexible and 
dynamic manner.'" !d. 
113. !d. at 2712 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 3fi6 U.S. 86, 101(1958)). 
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not to our own conceptions of decency, but to those of mod-
ern American society as a whole' in determining what stan-
dards have evolved."114 The essence of Justice White's 
opinion is that contemporary American society has evolved 
to the point that the Eighth Amendment must be construed 
to include a proportionality guarantee. 
IV. ANALYSIS: SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND THE 
CONSTITUTION, GUIDES FOR PROPORTIONALITY 
ANALYSIS WITHIN THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
Although the Eighth Amendment does not contain the 
word "proportionality," the average American probably be-
lieves that disproportionate criminal punishments violate the 
constitutional prohibition of "cruel and unusual punish-
ments." Nevertheless, in Harmelin the Court would com-
pletely destroy the Eighth Amendment's proportionality 
guarantee, while the concurring justices would render it 
completely impotent. The two opinions make a number of 
arguments premised on the following: 1) the Framers did 
not intend the Eighth Amendment to guarantee proportion-
ality of all criminal punishments; 2) Supreme Court prece-
dent does not establish a proportionality guarantee for non-
capital cases; and 3) capital and non-capital punishments 
are constitutionally distinguishable. Having asserted these 
arguments either implicitly or explicitly, the Court and con-
curring justices reach their respective conclusions. The Court 
concluded that there is no proportionality guarantee for non-
capital cases. The concurring justices determined that while 
the Eighth Amendment does guarantee proportionality, the 
presumption afforded state legislatures can only be overcome 
by a showing of "gross disproportionality." While both opin-
ions are superficially compelling, neither withstands equi-
table and logical scrutiny. Because the logical foundations of 
the two opinions are the same, refutation of those three 
premises invalidates both the Court's and the concurring 
Justices' opinions. 
A. Proportionality Analysis is Historically Justified 
While historical evidence may be read to support the 
conclusion that the Framers did not intend the Eighth 
114. !d. 
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Amendment to guarantee proportionality in all cases, an 
important caveat exists. When examining available evidence, 
that information must be placed in its historical context. In 
fact, after considering the theoretical underpinnings of the 
Eighth Amendment, some commentators have concluded that 
"[t]he legislative history of the eighth amendment gives no 
indication that the Framers intended to proscribe only spe-
cific forms of punishment."115 Those commentators empha-
size that there were only two dominant theories of punish-
ment in America in the late Eighteenth Century, and both 
support the inclusion of proportionality within the Eighth 
Amendment. 116 "[W]e cannot treat lightly the fact that the 
only two significant contemporary theories of punishment 
[retributivism and utilitarianism] both emphasized a single 
limitation-proportionality between crime and punish-
ment."117 This fact, and the continuing role of retributive 
and utilitarian philosophies in our criminal justice system, 
has caused one commentator to observe: 
Since it has been the cornerstone of penological thinking 
and practice in Western civilization for centuries, since it 
dominated when the eighth amendment was adopted, and 
since it underlay the document from which the amendment 
was drawn, proportionality stands as the underlying prin-
ciple most surely relied upon by the amendment's Framers. 
Furthermore, since retributive and utilitarian consider-
ations continue to dominate our penal structure, there is 
little reason to believe that the constitution has outgrown 
the proportionality requirement. 118 
B. Stare Decisis Mandates Adherence to the Proportionality 
Principle in All Cases 
In considering Supreme Court precedent in this area it 
is important to remember the distinction the Court drew in 
Rummel, and attempted to draw in this case, between pro-
portionality in capital and non-capital settings. There is a 
consensus that the Eighth Amendment mandates proportion-
ality analysis in capital cases. Therefore, this section will 
115. Wheeler, supra note 6, at 853. 
116. !d. 
117. !d. 
11R. !d. at 8fi3-fi4. 
\ 
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address the implications of that concession, and the 
precedential justifications for applying the proportionality 
principle to non-capital cases. The most compelling evidence 
that the Supreme Court has already extended proportion-
ality to non-capital cases are the Court's opinions in Weems, 
Trop, and Robinson. These cases have caused commentators 
to observe, "the eighth amendment has been held to be 
evolutionary and to limit both the amount and nature of 
permissible punishment."119 
1. Weems v. United States 
Given the revolutionary nature of the Court's holding in 
Weems, it should not be surprising that Justice Scalia felt 
compelled to attempt to reconcile the Court's holding in 
Harmelin with the proportionality analysis in Weems. How-
ever, Justice Scalia's efforts were logically inconsistent and 
are strong evidence that the Weems Court did in fact recog-
nize the need for proportionality of sentences for "terms of 
years." Referring to Weems, Justice Scalia argued, "[t]hat 
holding, and some of the reasoning upon which it was 
based, was not at all out of accord with the traditional 
understanding of the proVISIOn we have described 
above."120 The emphasis in that sentence must be upon 
the word "some," because there is little question that much 
of the Court's rationale in Weems is mutually exclusive with 
Justice Scalia's reading of the Eighth Amendment. 
For example, the Weems Court argued, "it is a precept 
of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated 
and proportioned to the offense."121 The Court did not q-
ualify this statement by distinguishing between methods of 
punishment, or between capital and non-capital cases. 
Rather, the Court very clearly recognized the universality of 
the proportionality principle. Further evidence that the 
Weems Court did not base its decision exclusively on the 
unique nature of the punishment imposed is that the Court 
specifically referred to both the nature and degree of pun-
ishment in justifying its decision. "Its punishments come 
under condemnation of the Bill of Rights, both on account of 
119. !d. at 842. 
120. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2699 (1991). 
121. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. ::!49, ::!66-67 (1910). 
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their degree and kind."122 The Court clearly indicated 
"both" degree and kind, independent of one another, invali-
dated the sentence. It is this part of the Weems Court's 
analysis that is irreconcilable with Harmelin, and that has 
caused commentators to argue that Weems clearly recognized 
the application of the proportionality principle in all cases, 
regardless of the mode of punishment imposed. 123 Had the 
Weems Court intended that sentence to be read conjunctively 
rather than disjunctively it would not have used the word 
"both." Certainly the author of the opinion recognized that 
using the word ''both" was inconsistent with interpreting the 
sentence as Justice Scalia would like. Thus, if we are to 
afford each word in that sentence meaning, then either the 
degree or mode of punishment may be sufficiently "cruel 
and unusual" to invalidate a sentence. 
Finally, the logical inconsistency of Justice Scalia's argu-
ment is illustrated by his assertion that Weems can be read 
to apply to either disproportionate modes of punishment 
alone, or to both disproportionate modes and degrees of 
punishment. 124 Because these two positions are diametri-
cally opposed, Justice Scalia's assertion cannot possibly be 
correct. The suggestion that Weems applies only to modes of 
punishment is an "all or nothing'' proposition. Thus, if any 
part of the Weems opinion must be read to apply to the 
122. ld. at 377. 
123. "In Weems the Court made it clear that the amendment also limits the 
amount of permissible punishment ... " Wheeler, supra note 6, at 842. 
"[In Weems] the Court broadened its prior eighth amendment analysis by find-
ing that an otherwise acceptable sentence can be so disproportionate to the offense 
for which it is imposed as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment." Martin R. 
Gardner, The Determinate Sentencing Movement and the Eighth Amendment: Exces· 
sive Punishment Before and After Rummel v. Estelle, 1980 DUKE L.J. 1103, 1113. 
The Weems Court's proportionality analysis and the language of the opinion 
suggest that a sentence could, solely because of its length, be so disproportionate 
to a particular crime as to constitute "cruel and unusual punishment." ld. at 1114. 
124. Scalia wrote: 
Since it contains language that will support either theory, our later opin-
ions have used Weems, as the occasion required, to represent either the 
principle that the Eighth Amendment bars not only those punishments 
that are "barbaric" but also those that are "excessive" in relation to the 
crime committed, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977), or the prin-
ciple that only a "unique ... punishment," a form of imprisonment differ-
ent from the "more traditional forms . . . imposed under the AngloSaxon 
system," can violate the Eighth Amendment, Rummel, 445 U.S., at 274-
275. 
Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2700. 
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degree of punishment, Justice Scalia must be wrong. His 
narrow interpretation, that Weems only applies to modes of 
punishment, renders much of the analysis in that opinion 
superfluous or moot. As indicated above, the Weems Court 
clearly considered both the mode of punishment and the 
degree. Thus Weems cannot be read as he suggests, but 
must instead be read to mandate proportionality analysis in 
all cases. 
2. Trop v. Dulles 
While clearly enunciating a principle of proportionality 
for non-capital cases, Weems fell short of defining the limits 
of this analysis. However, in Trop, the Court reaffirmed the 
role of proportionality analysis in non-capital cases and 
further defined the scope of the Eighth Amendment. In fact, 
the Trap Court defined the term "unusual" which lies at the 
heart of the debate about whether the Eighth Amendment 
proscription is limited to unconventional modes of punish-
ment. Mter citing previous Supreme Court cases, the Trap 
Court observed, "the Court simply examines the particular 
punishment involved in light of the basic prohibition against 
inhuman treatment, without regard to any subtleties of 
meaning that might be latent in the word 'unusual."'125 
Hence, Trap can and should be read to preclude Justice 
Scalia's narrow construction of the term unusual, as apply-
ing only to modes of punishment. Additionally, the inconsis-
tency of this construction with the Court's Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence is further evidenced by the Trap Court's 
conclusion that even if "unusual" is construed independent 
of "cruel," the word's meaning does not limit the Clause to 
only modes of punishment. "If the word 'unusual' is to have 
any meaning apart from the word 'cruel', however, the 
meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying something 
different from that which is generally done."126 Thus, to 
satisfy the Trop Court's definition, it need only be shown 
that a punishment has been applied atypically, not that the 
mode of punishment imposed is out of the ordinary. This 
clearly was the case in Harmelin. In fact, at the time the 
Harmelin court issued its opinion, Michigan was the only 
12fi. Trop v. Dulles, :Hi6 U.S. R6, 100 n. 82 (19fiR). 
126. Id. at 100-01. 
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state in the country to impose a sentence of life imprison-
ment without possibility of parole for the illegal possession 
of narcotics. 127 This alone constitutes "something different 
from that which is generally done." 
3. Robinson v. California 
The third, and perhaps most illustrative case in which 
the proportionality principle was applied without exclusive 
regard for the mode of punishment being used was 
Robinson. Because this case only involved imprisonment, it 
cannot be argued that the proportionality principle was 
applied to an "unusual" mode of punishment. In fact, the 
Robinson Court made it very clear that the mode of punish-
ment in that case was not a consideration. 128 Therefore, in 
an effort to distinguish Robinson, Justice Scalia attempted 
to argue that Robinson may not have actually been applying 
the proportionality principle. 129 This argument has a num-
ber of flaws. First, Justice Scalia gave no reason to believe 
that the Robinson Court did not rely on the proportionality 
principle. Second, such an assertion is contrary to the analy-
sis proffered by the Robinson Court. 130 Third, Justice 
Scalia offered no alternative explanation for invalidating 
Robinson's sentence. Finally, Justice Scalia's assertion that 
the Robinson court did not apply the proportionality princi-
ple patently contradicts his introduction of Robinson. Justice 
Scalia wrote, "[t]he first holding of this Court unqualifiedly 
applying a requirement of proportionality to criminal penal-
ties was issued 185 years after the Eighth Amendment was 
adopted."131 He then cited Robinson as that case. 132 
Clearly, the latter of these references to Robinson by Justice 
Scalia is inconsistent with his assertion that "there is no 
reason to believe that the decision was an application of the 
principle of proportionality."133 Given the lack of support 
for Justice Scalia's assertion, the logical inconsistency of his 
statements, and the plain language of the Robinson opinion, 
127. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2718 (1991). 
128. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962). 
129. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2701 n.14. 
130. Robinson, 370 U.S. 660. 
1:-ll. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. 2700-01. 
132. ld. at n.14. 
133. ld. 
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there is no question that the Robinson Court recognized the 
propriety of invalidating a prison sentence because it is 
disproportionate to the crime committed. 
B. Proportionality is Consisten"t with the Text and Structure 
of the Constitution 
Perhaps the most significant weakness in the Court's 
and concurring Justices' opinions is the implicit assertion 
that the Constitution generally, or the Eighth Amendment 
specifically, differentiates between capital and non-capital 
cases. Ironically, even if this is true, the distinction favors 
the consideration of proportionality in non-capital cases 
regardless of the mode of punishment involved. The second 
fundamental and fallacious premise is that whatever the 
Eighth Amendment meant in 1791, is what it should mean 
today. This contention is insupportable historically, structur-
ally, and textually. In fact, commentators and the Court 
itself, have forcefully argued that the meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment evolves with society to reflect contemporary 
social mores and conceptions of justice. 
1. The Eighth Amendment Text does not Distinguish be-
tween Modes of Punishment, or Capital and Non-capital 
Cases 
Contrary to the Court's implication, the Eighth Amend-
ment does not distinguish between types of punishment or 
types of cases. Hence, such distinctions cannot justify the 
application of the proportionality principle to some cases or 
modes of punishment, but not to others. Proportionality 
analysis within the Eighth Amendment is an all or nothing 
proposition. If it is justified in one case, or relative to one 
mode of punishment, it must always be considered. The 
Supreme Court explicitly affirmed this rationale in Robinson. 
A punishment out of all proportion to the offense may 
bring it within the ban against "cruel and unusual punish-
ments." . . . So may the cruelty of punishment, as, for 
example, disemboweling a person alive .... But the prin-
ciple that would deny power to exact capital punishment 
for a petty crime would also deny power to punish a per-
son by fine or imprisonment for being sick. 134 
1::!4. Robinson v. California, ::!70 U.S. 660, 676 (1962). 
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Hence, given Justice Scalia's concession that proportionality 
must be considered in capital cases, there is no justification 
for not applying the proportionality principle to non-capital 
cases involving sentences for terms of years. 
2. The Structure of the Constitution Requires Consideration 
of Proportionality 
There is little dispute that the Eighth Amendment pro-
scribes disproportionate fines and bail. This requirement 
stems from the word "excessive" in the Clause itself. Thus, 
there has been considerable debate about whether the 
Framers would have prohibited the imposition of dispropor-
tionate fines or bail, without intending that the same prohi-
bition apply to other available criminal sanctions. This para-
dox is particularly revealing when applied to Harmelin. Jus-
tice Scalia persuasively argued that it was not inconsistent 
for the Framers to apply this prohibition to fines and bail, 
but not to other modes of punishment. 
There is good reason to b~ concerned that fines, uniquely 
of all punishments, will be imposed in a measure out of 
accord with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence. 
Imprisonment, corporal punishment and even capital pun-
ishment cost a State money; fines are a source of revenue. 
As we have recognized in the context of other constitu-
tional provisions, it makes sense to scrutinize governmental 
action more closely when the State stands to benefit. 135 
However, Justice Scalia's rationale is logically deficient in 
two ways. First, his argument is valid only if proportionality 
analysis is not extended to any mode of punishment that 
does not have the potential to create revenue for the state. 
On the other hand, Justice Scalia conceded that the propor-
tionality principle should be applied to capital punishment, 
which he admits costs the state money, rather than produc-
ing income. 136 On this level, even under Justice Scalia's 
analysis, there is no distinction between imprisonment and 
capital punishment. Therefore, if the structure of the Eighth 
Amendment supports extension of the proportionality princi-
135. Harrnelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 26HO, 2693 n.9 (1991). 
136. ld. 
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pie to capital cases, it applies with equal force m all non-
capital cases. 
The second flaw in Justice Scalia's analysis is that he 
assumes the economic benefits of imprisonment never exceed 
its cost. However, Harmelin is a good illustration of an 
exception to this generalization. If, as in the case of drug 
distribution, the societal costs exceed the costs of imprison-
ment, a state legislature may be economically motivated to 
impose excessive prison terms to eliminate these drains on 
its state's economy. 
In short, the spectrum of available criminal sanctions 
ranges from fines to capital punishment. The Court impli-
citly argued that the structure of the Eighth Amendment 
supports proportionality analysis in both of those situations, 
but does not justify application of the principle to imprison-
ment. The logical inconsistency of, and lack of support for, 
that view leads to the conclusion that the structure of the 
Amendment mandates application of the proportionality 
principle in all non-capital cases regardless of the mode of 
punishment imposed. 
3. The Eighth Amendment Must be Allowed to Evolve 
All laws must be applied in light of their intended 
effects. Thus, the formulation of a judicious Eighth Amend-
ment theory must begin with an examination of the philo-
sophical underpinnings of the Amendment. The Court has, 
on several occasions, advanced its view of the Amendment's 
purpose. In Robinson, Justice Douglas observed, "[t]he 
Eighth Amendment expressed the revulsion of civilized man 
against barbarous acts - the 'cry of horror' against man's 
inhumanity to his fellow man."137 This view was echoed by 
the majority in Trap. 
The exact scope of the constitutional phrase "cruel and 
unusual" has not been detailed by this Court. But the 
basic policy reflected in these words is firmly established 
in the Anglo-American tradition of criminal justice .... 
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is 
nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has 
the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that 
137. Robinson, B70 U.S. at 676. 
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this power be exercised within the limits of civilized stan-
dards.13H 
Thus, as society's conceptions of humanity and justice 
evolve, so must the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 
"cruel and unusual punishments." 
V. CONCLUSION 
As is so often true, the outcome of this case was largely 
determined by the philosophical predilections of the Supreme 
Court Justices. Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist 
argued persuasively that the Eighth Amendment should be 
strictly construed within the parameters of the text and 
structure of the document, and that such a construction 
precludes recognition of proportionality in non-capital cases. 
The concurring Justices, on the other hand, grudgingly ac-
knowledge the Court's precedent in this area, and were 
willing to concede that stare decisis mandates recognition of 
a minimal proportionality guarantee in all cases. However, 
one should not be deceived by the apparent difference in 
these opinions. In practice,- the results are virtually identi-
cal. If possible the Court would eliminate the proportionality 
component of the Eighth Amendment, while the concurring 
Justices would choose instead, to leave the Eighth Amend-
ment a hollow shell. 
Given the similarity in their outcomes, it is understand-
able that both approaches suffer from the same infirmities. 
Both the court and the concurring Justices want to have 
their cake and eat it too. The Justices emphasized the nar-
rowness of the text and structure of the Eighth Amendment, 
but willingly recognize an exception for capital cases. Yet 
neither opinion justified this exception in terms of either the 
text or structure. Similarly, both opinions emphasized the 
intent of the Framers, and the importance of being bound 
by history. Yet, both opinions disregard the substantial body 
of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that has recognized the 
proportionality principle and the evolving nature of the 
proportionality principle. 
There was no majority in this case, thus the Court will 
eventually be called upon to revisit this issue. When this 
138. Trap, 356 U.S. 86, 99-100 (19fi8). 
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occurs, the Court should carefully consider not only the text 
and structure of the Amendment, but should examine with 
equal care and respect its own precedent. Moreover, the 
Court should be guided by the need for a consistent body of 
Eighth Amendment law. Finally, the Court must remember 
that it is the Constitution which they have been called upon 
to interpret, and that as such it cannot survive static inter-
pretations such as Harmelin. 
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it 
is true, from an experience of evils, but its general lan-
guage should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the 
form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, 
brings into existence new conditions and purposes. There-
fore, a principle to be vital must be capable of wider 
application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is 
particularly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral 
enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, 
to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to 
approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can 
approach it."139 
John C. Rooker 
139. Weems, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). 
